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INTRODUCTION
Growing up, as I was taught basic biology, chemistry, and physics in
elementary, middle and high school, I learned about how foolproof the scientific
method is. Western, traditional scientific inquiry is set up in such a way that there
should be minimal influence of cultural and social biases in what we take to be
scientific knowledge. that the scientific method is set up to correct for biases and
cultural beliefs. I have come to find this to be false as many knowledge claims which
we take to be scientific are, in fact, deeply embedded with problematic ideas of
gender conceptions that distort the knowledge claim. Perhaps scientists are trained to
engage with these problems of bias within formal scientific inquiry, but it remains
clear that we still lack a widespread, systematic understanding of how our knowledge
is influenced by cultural and social contexts. Thus, I turn to feminist epistemologists
to critically question traditional, western frameworks of knowledge inquiry in order to
engage with a new type of knowledge inquiry that is less prone to distortions due to
socially constructed conceptions about gender.
As context, it is important to note the ways in which women and individuals
from other marginalized communities have been, historically, excluded from formal,
scientific inquiry. “Western societies have labeled” scientific knowledge inquiry as
“‘masculine’ and prevented women from acquiring and producing it, often on the
pretext that it would divert their vital energies from their ‘natural’ reproductive labor”
(Anderson 50). As I examine how knowledge can be distorted due to problematic
cultural assumptions about gender, it is important to note the structural barrios that
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are in place for the promoting knowledge inquiry with diverse participation of
inquirers.
Although I am not going to discuss this in great detail, it is important to touch
briefly on which framework of feminism I am using. My main framework comes
from bell hooks, in Feminism is for Everybody, wherein she explains that “feminism
is a movement to end sexism, sexist exploitation, and oppression” (hooks viii).
Importantly, hooks doesn’t equate sexism with oppression, rather states that ending
all oppression and sexism is a part of feminism. As it will be explored, the ways that
our knowledge claims can be distorted serve to uphold systems of oppression that
work to benefit those in power.
Susan Sherwin provides another framework of feminism that is specifically
relevant when considering how scientific inquiry can be distorted due to problematic
gender stereotypes. Sherwin writes that feminism is about “changing the nature of
power structures in the world, moving from structures that grant some people power
over others to alternative social arrangements, which foster universal access to
personal power” (Sherwin 33). Therefore, according to Sherwin, feminism and
investigations of feminist epistemologists are designed not to promote any identity
over another but rather creates frameworks of inquiry wherein we can dismantle
systems of oppression and allow all people to access their own personal power to
their fullest capacity. I will use Sherwin’s framework in order to engage in knowledge
inquiry free of distortions due to widespread, cultural beliefs, and posit that there are
three criteria that should be a part of formal and informal knowledge inquiry.
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I will first explore the various ways that scientific inquiry may produce
distorted knowledge due to problematic social perceptions about knowledge and how
these maintain systems of power by perpetuating dominant narratives. I will first
engage with traditional, western definitions of scientific inquiry. I will then explore
the example of an explanation of human fertilization as a distorted knowledge claim
due to problematic social perceptions about gender. By entering into conversation
with feminist epistemologists about ways to restructure knowledge production, I will
attempt to understand whether we must systematically restructure formal inquiry or
apply it with more precision. I will also consider the role that values play within
inquiry and how we can make active decisions based our individual value
commitments, specifically feminist values. I will argue that in order to pursue
knowledge that is less distorted due to gender biases 1) we must critically examine
the knower in relation to what they know, 2) make efforts to diversify inquirers
within knowledge inquiry and 3) acknowledge the role that values play in inquiry,
and allow for active decisions to be made about values. In order to pursue this project,
I have six main sections.
In Section 1, I explore a foundational western, traditional definition of
science. This framework leaves us wondering how we engage with knowledge claims
that are distorted due to widespread cultural beliefs. In Section 2, I examine how
gender has influenced explanations of human fertilization and how this distortion of
knowledge complicates the traditional, western framework presented in Section 1. We
are then left with a question about whether the framework of inquiry fails in this
particular case of if it gives rise to a larger, systematic concern. Thus, in Section 3, I
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turn to feminist epistemologists who take on issues of traditional western frameworks
of knowledge inquiry. Namely, evidence-based inquiry (empiricism) and the question
of objectivity. Feminist epistemologist Sandra Harding presents a comprehensive
argument about the role of the inquirer in relation to the content of knowledge.
Therefore, in Section 4, I explore the relationship between the knower and what they
claim to know, turning to Sandra Harding and standpoint epistemology to provide an
account of a new form of objectivity. I will explore standpoint epistemology in depth
in that section as well. I also focus on the importance of a diverse group of inquirers
as a means to minimize problematic biases that affect knowledge inquiry and
maximize objectivity. We are then left with the question about what we can do when
we realize that our inquiry is skewed due to widespread, dominant cultural beliefs. In
Section 5, therefore, I consider what it means to acknowledge values as an integral
part of scientific inquiry, and in doing so reject value-free science. I also argue that if
we acknowledge values as a part of scientific inquiry, we can make decisions based
on values we would like to uphold, particularly feminist values as they work to
dismantle oppressive systems and question knowledge frameworks that are in place
that uphold these systems. In Section 6, I explore an objection to my framework of
inquiry presented by Susan Haack wherein she argues that feminist epistemologists
are mischaracterizing knowledge inquiry and should, instead, focus on solving
distorted knowledge claims by ensuring that inquiry remains evidence-based and
value free. Ultimately, however, I stand by my argument that if we 1) critically and
systematically examine the knower in relation to what they know, 2) make efforts to
diversify inquirers and promote marginalized perspectives as well as 3) acknowledge
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the role that values play in inquiry and promote feminist values, then we will be
engaging in knowledge inquiry that is best suited to produce undistorted knowledge.
SECTION 1: A FRAMEWORK OF TRADITIONAL SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY,
LASTRUCCI
In this section I will explore a definition of traditional, western scientific
inquiry as presented by Carlo Lastrucci. By first understanding the key components
of the definition we will then be able to examine where knowledge inquiry is failing
when knowledge claims are distorted due to problematic dominant beliefs about
gender roles. Carlo Lastrucci, a psychologist and researcher at San Francisco State
College, explored the definition of science and importance of the scientific method in
his book, The Scientific Approach; Basic Principle of the Scientific Method. Although
Lastrucci’s book is not widely cited, it is integral in how it condenses information
from a multitude of textbooks and sources to create an overarching, comprehensive
definition of science. For the scope of my project, Lastrucci’s work provides an
important definition of western, modern scientific inquiry. In order to understand
where the process of scientific inquiry fails to produce knowledge claims free of
cultural and social influence due to gender (and other) biases we must first engage
with what scientific inquiry is and how the process of inquiry promotes knowledge
claims free of distortions.
Carlo Lastrucci focuses specifically on scientific inquiry and the criteria for
considering something to be science. Importantly, to Lastrucci “science is a method,
not a philosophy” (Lastrucci 30). Therefore, Lastrucci’s definition of science is about
the scientific method. Science is an exemplary case of knowledge inquiry as it is the
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premier example of correcting for biases and promoting objectivity. In this project,
therefore, I use scientific inquiry as the paradigm for what should be generating
undistorted knowledge claims.
Due to the way “science” is operationalized in our everyday usage of the term,
Lastrucci states that, “it seems appropriate to define the term “science” in a
combination of three ways (a) analytically – i.e., in terms of its essential and
distinctive component attributes, (b) functionally – i.e. in terms of the services it
performs, and (c) operationally – i.e. in terms of the processes or operations
performed when practicing it” (Lastrucci 6). Here, it is clear that Lastrucci’s
definition will engage with the definition of science as a method.
Lastrucci claims that an extensive examination of standard books about
science shows a general consensus among “authoritative writers” with regards to the
“essential attributes and processes of science” (Lastrucci 6). According to this
consensus science can be defined as: “an objective, logical, and systematic method of
analysis of phenomena, devised to permit the accumulation of reliable knowledge”
(Lastrucci 6). Lastrucci explains each of the key terms of this definition of science:
“objective,” “logical,” “systematic,” “method,” “phenomena,” “devised,”
“accumulation,” and “reliable.” For the purpose of my analysis, I will focus on his
explanations of the terms “objective”, “logical”, “systematic”, “phenomena”, and
“reliable” as these are key components to understanding where scientific inquiry can
produce knowledge that is distorted due to problematic cultural assumptions,
particularly in regards to gender. In this section, I will expand on each of these terms
and why they are important components of formal knowledge inquiry. In Section 2, I
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will tie Lastrucci’s key terms to a discussion of human fertilization as an example of a
knowledge claim that is distorted due to widespread, problematic cultural stereotypes
about gender.
The first key term that Lastrucci explains is objective. Lastrucci states that
objectivity “refers to attitudes devoid of personal whim, bias or prejudice, and to
methods centered around ascertainment of the publicly demonstrable qualities of a
phenomenon” (6). He argues that knowledge claims should be “publicly
demonstrable” as science should be available to any “interested and competent
person,” not just a “favored few” (Lastrucci 6). Thus, Lastrucci claims that objectivity
requires that the knowledge claim be accessible, demonstrable and corroborated by
the larger scientific community. Lastrucci further explains that “objectivity in science
denotes an impartial viewpoint which refrains from inferring or implying that any
phenomenon is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ per se” (7). Lastrucci affirms that scientists follow the
scientific method to avoid that their inquiry be influenced by self-interest or personal
beliefs and that they work on taking a view from ‘no-where’ such that their personal
prejudices don’t affect the knowledge content.
The second key term that Lastrucci defines is logical. Science is a “systematic
arrangement of facts, theories, instruments and processes —all interrelated by
principles of reasoned thought” (Lastrucci 9). These principles string together
scientific claims and are reasoned through logic, thus making science a logical
process. Lastrucci states that, “since science is a logical system, it is also self-critical
i.e., it contains within its methods the tools for its own analysis” (Lastrucci 10).
Particularly, because scientific claims are (and historically have been) proven false,
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scientists must constantly check for failures by surrounding themselves with “a cloak
of critical doubt” (Lastrucci 10). Here, Lastrucci makes it clear that this “cloak of
critical doubt” is a fundamental component of scientific inquiry such that scientists
constantly check for potential false knowledge claims as a way to be critical of their
own method. Importantly, Lastrucci makes it clear his discussion of logical that he is
operating under two main principles. The first, that knowledge is somehow “out
there” such that through well-reasoned principles we are able to understand how our
facts, theories, instruments, etc. connect. The second, is that scientists, as individuals,
are responsible for constantly checking knowledge for possible failures. Nonetheless,
in Lastrucci’s definition of objective, it is clear that an important component of
inquiry is having the knowledge claim be accessible to a community of knowers.
Therefore, although the onus is on the individual scientist to be constantly checking
for false knowledge claims, it is also assumed that the same knowledge claim is
corroborated by the larger scientific community.
The third key term that Lastrucci’s defines is systematic. Lastrucci explains
that science proceeds in an “orderly manner both in its organization of a problem and
in its methods of operation. It does not proceed randomly or haphazardly” (10). All
scientists that recognize and practice the scientific method use the same “basic rules
of evidence and reasoning in order to validate their conclusions” (Lastucci 11).
Science, therefore, is a systematic approach to inquiry that is replicable and
minimizes errors. Thus, if science, is systematically producing distorted knowledge
claims, then we must somehow adjust the system of inquiry such that we can continue
to rely on its outcomes (reliability will be taken up later on).
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The fourth key term that Lastrucci examines is phenomena. The scientific
method, Lastrucci explains, is applicable to “any kind of behavior or event that has
objectively demonstrable attributes or consequences” (Lastrucci 12). Lastrucci further
explains that science:
…is objective insofar as it studies phenomena having behavioral attributes or
consequences. If something exists or occurs having such attributes that it can be
objectively ascertained and confirmed, then it can be studied scientifically … for
example, a presumably subjective behavior (say, a dream) cannot be studied
scientifically until and unless it can be shown to exhibit objective attribute or
consequences. (Lastrucci 12)
Lastrucci’s analysis of phenomena is tied to his discussion of objectivity such
that if you are able to understand and conceive of something objectively, then it is a
phenomenon that you can study with the scientific method. Although a vague
definition of phenomenon, one thing made clear is that someone, namely the scientist,
needs to decide what it means for the perceived phenomena to be considered
objective.
The final component Lastrucci explains is reliability or reliable knowledge.
Lastrucci states that science is reliable as it involves the “kind of knowledge which
one can depend upon in terms of predictability. In this sense, then, reliable knowledge
is synonymous with exact or correct knowledge” (16). Lastrucci makes it clear that
knowledge produced through the scientific method is correct or exact because it
serves as a means to predict future events/phenomena. Recall the discussion about the
term logical, wherein Lastrucci states that scientists should investigate knowledge
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claims with “a cloak of critical doubt.” Interestingly it seems that Lastrucci sets up a
framework in which knowledge is simultaneously taken to be correct and fallible.
This apparent contradiction lays in that scientific knowledge is reliable as it predicts
future events, yet as a logical system scientific inquiry must also have measures in
places to be self-critical. Therefore, insofar as knowledge claims are able to predict
future events we can consider them to be correct or exact but we must ensure that we
are always critical of the content of knowledge.
In this section, I have provided an account of scientific inquiry as presented by
Lastrucci. I explored the main components of Lastrucci’s account of scientific
inquiry– “objective,” “logical,” “systematic,” “phenomena,” and “reliable
knowledge/reliability.” I also provided a brief explanation of each key term and what
it provides for the larger context of the definition. Here, I will quickly recap each of
the key terms of the definition as they will be important in the following section.
Objectivity assumes that personal bias, prejudices, whims, etc. will be left out of
knowledge inquiry. Logical asserts that our facts, theories, etc. are interrelated
through principles which are established through well-reasoned thought. Lastrucci
also establishes an expectation that scientists, through a “cloak of critical doubt,” will
be continuously critical of their findings. Systematic means that scientific inquiry is
always replicable and practiced as a system, making it clear that if there is a persistent
issue systematic issues to knowledge inquiry then there must be a systematic shift in
the way inquiry is conducted. Phenomena is the behavior or event that is considered
objective such that it can be studied. What is considered phenomena is decided by
scientists themselves based on whether that phenomena can be objectively studied.
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Lastly, reliability or reliable knowledge confirms that we can trust knowledge
acquired through scientific inquiry as correct or exact since it we can depend on its
predictability.
So far, I have provided a comprehensive definition of scientific inquiry,
emphasizing key components. In the following section, I will present an example of
human fertilization which a moment in which knowledge can be distorted due to
problematic cultural assumptions about gender. I will then turn to Lastrucci’s
discussion of the scientific method to assess how we engage with distorted knowledge
claims due to problematic cultural biases within this traditional epistemological
framework.
SECTION 2: GENDER BIAS IN THE EXPLANATION OF HUMAN
FERTILIZATION
In this following section, I will explore what it means that knowledge is,
often, influenced by problematic cultural beliefs in ways that western, modern
scientific inquiry, as described by Lastrucci, does not provide us with the tools to
engage with. In order to analyze how scientific inquiry is failing, we need to first
understand how beliefs about gender can distort our knowledge claims. I will use the
description of human fertilization to show how scientific knowledge claims can be
influenced by problematic cultural beliefs about gender. We are left questioning
whether the distorted knowledge claim about fertilization is an issue with the way that
scientific inquiry was performed in this particular case or if it is indicative of a larger
systematic issue.
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Spanier, in “Im/partial Science: Gender Ideology in Molecular Biology,”
explores distortions of representation of reproductive cells and fertilization. Spanier
explores how gender stereotypes have permeated discussions of fertilization in the
first edition of the introductory textbook Molecular Cell Biology published in 1983
(59). The description in the textbook provides the learner with an image of a passive
egg and an active sperm, crediting the fertilization to the ejaculation of the sperm
with little mention of the participation of the egg (Spanier 59). The visual invoked is
of the sperm doing all the work, from travelling to and penetrating the surface of the
egg. In this representation, however, key scientific facts are omitted (Spanier 60).
Within the biologically female body, the vaginal contractions and “sweeping waves
of cilia lining the fallopian tubes” are vital to the sperm reaching the egg.
Furthermore, the language of “penetration” of the sperm into the egg’s membrane is
inaccurate as the “fusion of the egg and sperm membranes” involves a secretion from
the female reproductive tract to activate the sperms enzymes (Spanier 60). Using
terms such as “penetrate” creates a visual wherein the sperm is given sexualized
imagery, namely of “a being with a penis” (Spanier 60). Thus, there is a
superimposing of gender stereotypes, of the passive female and the active male, onto
the biological process of fertilization (Spanier 61).
The influence of cultural beliefs on scientific explanations, like fertilization, is
not uncommon and has been widely documentedi (Spanier 61). Spanier emphasizes
that representing the process of fertilization through the use of gender stereotype can
inadvertently affect our knowledge of “nature” and what we think is an accurate
depiction of a natural process (61).
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Critically examining how the process of fertilization is explained allows for an
understanding of how gender stereotypes have a deep, and often unnoticed, influence
in what we take to be knowledge. Without Spanier’s detailed analysis of the active
role the egg plays in gamete fusion, a role that is even more active than that of the
sperm’s, most people (like myself) who were taught in a similar way to the
explanation in the Molecular Cell Biology, would continue to believe a false scientific
representation of fertilization. Spanier’s explanation of human fertilization and
analysis of how fertilization has been falsely represented shows us how deeply
ingrained sexist and androcentric views can be in our knowledge inquiry. Thus, the
gendered representation of knowledge in this example prevents us from knowing the
actual complex interactions that occur in fertilization from both the sperm and the
egg.
Now that I have briefly presented and explored the way that gender
stereotypes can influence knowledge and how it often goes unnoticed, I will examine
how the example of fertilization stands in relation to Lastrucci’s definition of
scientific inquiry. As Spanier presents it, it can be assumed that research on the
process of fertilization adhered closely to the scientific method (Spanier 60). Thus,
the problem lays in how the influence of gender stereotypes distort knowledge
content even when adhering closely to the scientific method. It is clear, therefore, that
we must re-examine Lastrucci’s definition of scientific inquiry as to reexamine how
problematic, cultural perceptions of gender can distort knowledge claims.
First off, the example of human fertilization distorted by cultural assumptions
about gender calls into question Lastrucci’s emphasis on objectivity. It seems that the
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influence of problematic assumptions about gender roles on knowledge inquiry
allowed for false (and presumably ‘non-objective’) “facts” to be relayed. It is
important to note that Lastrucci’s definition of objectivity states that science or
scientific knowledge is “objective” such that it isn’t influenced by personal prejudice
or bias. If we take Lastrucci’s definition of objectivity, then the knowledge claim
about human fertilization fails to be objective as it is clearly influenced by
stereotypical gender roles of the passive female and the active male. Although
Lastrucci seems more concerned with personal prejudice or bias rather than
widespread cultural beliefs, this example makes it clear that widespread cultural
biases or prejudices can have damaging effects on the content of knowledge claims.
Therefore, it seems that Lastrucci’s definition of objective fails to engage with
instances where all people within that scientific community share the same biases.
Therefore, the example of fertilization sheds light on our need to expand the
definition of objectivity as presented by Lastrucci to consider culture-wide biases.
Another term that is brought into question is phenomena. In example of
human fertilization, a decision was made about what was considered a part of inquiry
such that we could conceive of its objectivity. It seems, however, that, connected to
my concerns about objectivity, the example of fertilization brings into question our
ability to separate phenomena from cultural context and social influence such that it
can be studied objectively. It seems that our ability to distinguish between phenomena
and cultural context is questionable as they are so deeply imbedded in one another.
The explanation of human fertilization as distorted knowledge due to
problematic assumptions about gender roles, brings up questions about the reliability
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of knowledge claims. As Lastrucci defines it, science should be reliable such that we
are able to base principles and theories on one another, trusting that knowledge
inquiry produces accurate knowledge content. However, we cannot base any other
knowledge claim on this description of fertilization as it is distorted and false. Thus,
because knowledge inquiry of human fertilization adhered closely to the scientific
method yet still produced distorted knowledge claims, calls into question the method
as a whole.
A further aspect of Lastrucci’s definition that the example of human
fertilization fails to meet is systematic. The scientific method is set up in such that it
is performed in the same way by different scientists. However, distortions in the
explanation of fertilization were systematically accepted until Spanier pointed out the
role of the egg scientifically. Even though scientists studied fertilization in the same,
presumably reliable systematic inquiry, due to the social conditions and context with
which it was studied, the interpretations of the phenomenon continued to be
influenced by problematic conceptions of gender. The self-critical component of
inquiry namely, “the cloak of critical doubt” should have engaged in a revision
process to check for false knowledge claims; however, because the scientific
community shared in this social conception of gender roles, the self-critical
component as not sufficient.
In this section, I assessed the way that a presumably scientific understanding
of human fertilization can be influenced by problematic conceptions of gender roles
and how it brings into question a few of Lastrucci core components of his definition namely, objectivity, phenomena, reliability, and systematic method. As it has been
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discussed, the knowledge of human fertilization, which is deeply influenced by social
perceptions of gender roles, is neither objective nor reliable. It also brings into
question what it means to consider phenomena to be objective. Furthermore, the
widely accepted description of human fertilization poses a question about how
scientific inquiry, as a systematic approach, is conducted. Overall, it seems to leave us
with the question: is there a problem with the systematic approach of scientific
inquiry or does the problem lay in this particular conception and explanation of
human fertilization?
In order to answer this question, I will examine how feminist epistemologists have
engaged with, and critiqued, core tenets of traditional epistemological inquiry, like
Lastrucci’s.
SECTION 3: FEMINIST EMPIRICISTS AND “STRONG OBJECTIVITY”
In the previous section we were left with a question about whether the
scientific method fails to produce knowledge free from bias in the particular
circumstance of human fertilization or if that particular example is a symptom of a
larger, systematic issue. Feminist epistemologists have taken on this question from
various angles, critiquing the core tenets of the definition of scientific inquiry as
presented by Lastrucci. In this section I will explore feminist epistemologists’
analysis of empiricism and objectivity to shed like on this question. Part 1 of this
section, I will examine arguments presented by feminist empiricists, such as Elizabeth
Anderson, and how they argue that applying the scientific method with more rigor. In
Part 2, I will explore Harding’s argument for standpoint epistemology, the role of
marginalized perspectives and what it means to consider the social relation of the

Bucciarelli 20
subject of knowledge as an objecitivty-maximizing strategy. I will ultimately argue,
with the use of Harding’s term “strong objectivity,” that feminist empiricists fail to
fully address the systematic issues that arise from the structure and application of the
traditional, western scientific method.
PART 1: ELIZABETH ANDERSON AND OTHER FEMINIST EMPIRICISTS
Many critiques of scientific inquiry explore the limitations of empirical
investigation. Lastrucci engage with this issue in his book, in his chapter on the
tensions between empiricism and rationalism. Lastrucci defines empiricism as “the
conviction that sensory experience should be regarded as the most reliable source of
knowledge” (Lastrucci 30). Lastrucci states that “empirical evidence,” although not
the only part of scientific inquiry “is basic to science” (Lastrucci 30). Consistent with
Lastrucci’s account of science, empirical investigation must observe a phenomenon
that can described objectively.
Elizabeth Anderson in “Feminist Epistemology, an Interpretation and a
Defense,” argues that pursuing feminist epistemology does not require a radical shift
in our “internal commitments of empirical science” (52). Instead, Anderson argues
that feminist epistemology is a subset of “naturalized social epistemology” such that
naturalized epistemology asks science to provide “an account of its own activity,”
wherein we can analyze how scientific findings came about (Anderson 54). Anderson
further explains:
Social epistemology is the branch of naturalized epistemology that
investigates the influence of specifically social factors on knowledge
production ... feminist epistemology can be regarded as the branch of social
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epistemology that investigates the influence of socially constructed
conceptions and norms of gender and gender-specific interests and
experiences on the production of knowledge [asking how] historical exclusion
of women from theoretical inquiry has affected the direction and content of
research in fields … ; how the use of gender metaphors in biology has made
some phenomena more salient than others… how the feminist movement has
changed our data, our ways of describing the data, and our theories about the
differences between men and women. (Anderson 54)
Anderson argues that the questions posed at the end of the quote above are, at their
root, empirical ones. To Anderson, questions about how the exclusion of women from
theoretical inquiry have affected the direction and content of research can be
answered by examining the evidence for each of these questions. For instance, in the
example of distorted the knowledge claim about fertilization we would need to
understand the influence that gender stereotypes and gender roles had on the
representation of that knowledge empirically. This could lead us to questions like:
What assumptions about gender roles did the team performing the research or writing
the textbooks hold? What was involved in observing the process of fertilization? Was
there a conversation about ensuring that social expectations about gender didn’t get
mapped onto the scientific explanation? etc. It is clear that these questions don’t
explicitly condemn the work that the scientific method did to “discover” the process
of fertilization but rather asks explicit questions to understand what played into the
knowledge claim being distorted due to socially constructed conceptions and norms
about gender. Anderson argues, therefore, that “feminist criticisms and remedies can
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be seen as particular, if surprising, instances of general types of criticism and remedy
already acknowledged and accommodated by scientific practice” (54). Anderson
asserts that there is nothing inherently wrong with the scientific method; rather, there
is a flaw in the way that the investigation was conducted in this particular instance.
Importantly, Anderson would agree with Lastrucci that knowledge is “out there,” and
so, a more rigorous application of the scientific method would allow for more
accurate knowledge claims that are not influenced by problematic cultural
assumptions about gender.
Anderson argues that our typical belief-forming practices provide us with the
tools to correct distorted knowledge claims as they arise. Therefore, we do not need to
change our practices, only adhere to them more rigorously. In order to understand if
our beliefs are true and whether we stick with them or dismiss them, we, typically,
reflect on our belief-forming practices themselves. The process of reflecting on our
belief-forming practices is the “self-reflexive endorsement test” (Anderson 55). If the
belief fails the “self-reflexive endorsement test” we decide that our belief-forming
wasn’t reliable and dismiss the belief. Other processes, however, satisfy the “selfreflexive endorsement test” as our beliefs “and the beliefs to which they give rise to”
are verified and we decide to continue believing in them (Anderson 55). Anderson
continues by stating that “a knowledge practice is rational to the extent that it
promotes such critical self-reflections and responds to them by checking or canceling
out the unreliable belief-formation mechanisms and enabling the reliable ones”
(Anderson 55). In other words, Anderson claims that we must adapt our beliefforming practices as we find them to be unreliable. Consider, for instance, optical
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illusions. When we realize that what we thought we were seeing was an optical
illusion, we adjust our understanding of knowledge content such that we can separate
what we think we are seeing from what we know is happening. Therefore, if we are
able to show that our belief-forming is producing unreliable or distorted knowledge
due to cultural beliefs about gender, we should cancel those belief-forming techniques
and enable reliable ones.
In the example of knowledge distortion in human fertilization, Anderson
would argue that we should dismiss the specific knowledge claim and, in the future,
adhere more closely to a belief-forming strategy that emphasizes checking for the
influence of cultural beliefs on knowledge inquiry, specifically when research topics
that may involve mapping social constructs on scientific data (i.e. social conceptions
of gender and human fertilization).
Anderson’s view on the example of fertilization is shared by other feminist
empiricists. Sharon Begley, in “The Science Wars,” examines how scientific
knowledge has been improved over the years, citing human fertilization as a primary
example. Begley emphasizes that science has “built-in mechanisms to catch and
correct the results of human foibles. After all, researchers did finally recognize that
molecules in the egg actively participate in [fertilization]…” (Begley 118). Begley
furthers her argument by quoting the astrophysicist Ashman, who states that despite
scientists being influenced by factors they shouldn’t be (such as social and cultural
values), we “are still measuring something real … and [historically] with better data
the scientific method allowed us to converge on the right answer” (Begley 118).
Begley concludes that we should work on being attentive to “when the research is
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being skewed by social and political values, and when those biases have been
recognized and neutralized by the scientific method” (Begley 118). Here, Begley
argues that because we were able to figure out the truth eventually, we should apply
the scientific method more vigorously such that we find accurate knowledge sooner.
It is clear that Begley echoes Anderson’s argument that in order to correct for the
influence of social and cultural gender stereotypes of scientific inquiry, we must
adhere more rigorously to the scientific method and ask empirical questions about
how social factors can affect knowledge content. Importantly, Anderson and other
feminist empiricists such as Begley, engage in the type of scientific inquiry similar to
the one presented by Lastrucci that values the importance of empirical investigation.
To reiterate, in order to answer the question of whether the process of
scientific inquiry fails because of the way that gender influences knowledge inquiry
on a systematic level or if this particular example of fertilization is an exception,
feminist empiricists would stand by the scientific method, trusting empiricism and a
well-performed “self-reflective endorsement test” to address and correct knowledge
claims that have been distorted due to socially constructed conceptions of gender.
PART 2: STANDPOINT EPISTEMOLOGY AND “STRONG OBJECTIVITY,”
SANDRA HARDING
Contrasting to feminist empiricists, feminist epistemologist Sandra Harding
argues the distorted knowledge in the description of human fertilization due to
socially constructed conceptions about gender exemplifies the flaw in the scientific
method, more specifically, in our application and understanding of objectivity.
Harding maintains that feminist empiricists present a weak solution to a larger,

Bucciarelli 25
systematic issue. In “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is ‘Strong
Objectivity?’” Harding criticizes empiricism as a foundation of the scientific method,
arguing that we must change our understanding of objectivity such that we are as
critical of the person involved in knowledge production (the subject of knowledge) as
we are about the content of the knowledge (the object of knowledge) (Harding 437).
In this section, I will begin by exploring Harding’s critique of feminist
empiricist arguments. I will then examine what Harding proposes instead, unpacking
standpoint epistemology as an objectivity-maximizing resource as well as examining
Harding’s claim for “strong objectivity.”
Harding calls feminist empiricists, such as Anderson and Begley,
“spontaneous feminist empiricistsii” because they take the problem with distorted
knowledge due to gender stereotypes/biases as one of “bad science” and due to the
lack of rigor of applying the scientific method in this case, making them spontaneous
(Harding 439). Harding vehemently disagrees, arguing that the distorted knowledge
claim should be considered a systematic issue. Harding elaborates:
…spontaneous feminist empiricists think that insufficient care and rigor in
following existing methods and norms is the cause of sexist and androcentric
results of research … Standpoint theorists think that this is only part of the
problem. They [spontaneous feminist empiricists] point out that retroactively,
and with the help of the insights of women's movement, one can see these
sexist or androcentric practices in the disciplines. However, the methods and
norms in the disciplines are too weak to permit researchers to systematically
identify and eliminate from the results of research those social values,
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interests, and agendas that are shared by the entire scientific community, or
virtually all of it. (Harding 440).
To Harding, “spontaneous feminist empiricists” argue that we can point to places
where science inquiry has failed and correct those knowledge claims retroactively.
However, according to Harding, the issue is that the system of scientific inquiry itself
is too weak to systematically identify how knowledge claims are influenced by
problematic social conceptions of gender.
Harding pinpoints that the problem lays in objectivity not having “been
‘operationalized’ in such a way that the scientific method can detect sexist and
androcentric assumptions that are "the dominant beliefs of an age"— that is, that are
collectively (versus only individually) held” (440). In the fertilization example, for
instance, the issue was not that one individual scientist held a problematic notion of
social gender roles that distorted the content of knowledge. Rather the issue was that
the dominant narrative at the time was one of a problematic social conception of
gender roles such that it was not identified and, thus, created a knowledge distortion.
Thus, Harding argues for a new formulation of objectivity that will engage with
systematic belief systems, “strong objectivity.” In order to understand how to
operationalize Harding’s “strong objectivity,” we must engage with Harding’s
framework of standpoint epistemology.
Harding’s argument for “strong objectivity” is based in standpoint
epistemology. Harding argues that we must critically engage with the social position
of the knower and how the knower relates to the object of knowledge. Harding traces
back to the origins of standpoint theory, making it clear how important it is to
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understand the knower in relation to the object of knowledge. Harding states, “the
intellectual history of feminist standpoint theory is conventionally traced to Hegel’s
reflections on what can be known about the master/slave relationship from the
standpoint of the slave’s life versus that of the master’s life…” (Harding 441).
Although Hegel’s master/slave dichotomy has many important philosophical
implications, the takeaway here is the major differences one can imagine between the
stories and realities of the slave as opposed to those of the master. If the slave was not
given an epistemic perspective, there is valuable knowledge about the experience that
is not be accessible.
If we were inquiring about the hardships of slavery, it is important to know
whose account of slavery we are engaging with because they each, presumably,
present different epistemic accounts of the same event. Thus, it becomes clear that
there is an epistemically different point of view between the slave and the master. For
instance, Thus, the relationship between the knower and the object of knowledge is
important to understanding the content of the knowledge claim.
After making it clear why standpoint epistemology emphasizes the subject of
knowledge in relation to the object of knowledge, Harding specifically advocates that
we maximize objectivity of knowledge claims by promoting marginalized
perspectives within knowledge inquiry and making information about the relationship
between the knower and the content of knowledge widely accessible. In the following
paragraphs, I will briefly explore her argument for marginalized perspectives and the
relationship between the subject and object of knowledge.

Bucciarelli 28
Harding explains the relationship between dominant and marginalized
perspectives epistemic position:
A social history of standpoint would focus on what happens when
marginalized peoples begin to gain public voice. In societies where scientific
rationality and objectivity are claimed to be highly valued by dominant
groups, marginalized peoples and those who listen attentively to them will
point out that from the perspective of marginal lives, the dominant accounts
are less than maximally objective. Knowledge claims are always socially
situated and the failure by dominant groups critically and systematically to
interrogate their advantaged social situation and the effect of such advantages
on their beliefs leaves their social situation as scientifically and
epistemologically disadvantaged one for generating knowledge. (Harding 442)
Here, standpoint epistemology allows us to understand that every knowledge claim is
socially situated such that dominant groups should reflect on the ways that their
advantaged position in society intertwines with her beliefs. Here, Haridng makes it
clear that dominant groups are failing to engage in this type of critical inquiry and
being attentive to marginalized voices will show that dominant accounts are failing to
maximize objectivity.
Harding argues that in order to maximize objectivity, we need to engage in
standpoint analysis and critically examine the subject of knowledge as part of the
object of knowledge. Standpoint epistemologists have made the social situatedness of
the subject of knowledge a “systematically accessible resource for maximizing
objectivity” (Harding 458). In other words, having access to how the object of
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knowledge exists in relation to the subject of knowledge is an objectivity-maximizing
strategy as it provides a larger framework for the knowledge content and the validity
of the content in relation to the inquirer.
Using standpoint epistemology’s objectivity maximizing strategy as a starting
point, Harding argues that “strong objectivity” requires that “the subject of
knowledge be placed on the same critical, causal plane as the objects of knowledge”
(Harding 458). Harding continues by stating that the:
subject of knowledge – the individual and the historically located social
community whose unexamined beliefs its members are likely to hold
‘unknowingly’ so to speak – must be considered as part of the object of
knowledge from the perspective of scientific method. All of the kinds of the
objectivity-maximizing procedures focused on the nature and/or social
relations that are the direct object of observation and reflection must also be
focused on the observers and reflectors – scientists and the larger assumptions
that they share.” (Harding 459)
Here, Harding does not fully explain what types of objectivity-maximizing
procedures that should be applied. However, Harding makes it clear that in order for
any of these tests to be applied, we must have accessible information about the
relationship between the subject and object of knowledge. To engage with Harding’s
“strong objectivity,” therefore, we must apply every consideration of objectivity to
the object of knowledge and the subject of knowledge such that both the object and
subject of knowledge are on the same critical plane (Harding 458). Importantly,
Harding makes it clear that these tests should be applied to the individual scientist as
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well as to the larger scientific community to assess the collective assumptions that
they share.
Recall, at the end of Section 2, after an analysis of how gender stereotypes
distorted the knowledge content of the scientific explanation of human fertilization,
we were left with the question about whether the issue was due to a flaw in that
particular circumstance or if there is a larger, structural issue with the method of
scientific knowledge inquiry. Feminist empiricists argue that we are able to avoid
knowledge content distortions by applying the scientific method more rigorously. It
became clear, through a brief analysis of Harding’s position towards feminist
empiricists, that Harding argues for a systematic solution to distorted knowledge
content. According to Harding, the issue lays in how objectivity is operationalized.
Harding employs standpoint epistemology to explain why the social situatedness of
the subject of knowledge is important. Recall, Harding argues that in order to
systematically identify and engage with the ways cultural belief systems influence our
knowledge, we need to incorporate an understanding of the subject of knowledge in
relation to the object of knowledge and make that information accessible as a part of
the knowledge claim. Arguing that it is epistemically meaningful to engage with how
the social position of an epistemic agent can influence the content of knowledge,
Harding argues that in order to maximize objectivity, the relationship between the
subject and object of knowledge (what Harding coins “strong objectivity”) should be
systematically accessible as a part of inquiry.
Harding, in her analysis of maximizing objectivity through standpoint
epistemology, asks how to systematically identify how social conceptions influence
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knowledge. Feminist empiricists fail to systematically engage, instead they act
retroactively, affirming that we now have insight into the ways that scientific inquiry
could have been done differently in specific cases (i.e. the fertilization example).
Thus, Harding provides an argument for how to move into a knowledge inquiry that
can identify the negative impact of widespread cultural biases on knowledge content
as it happens. Thus, in the following section I will examine what it means engage in
knowledge inquiry through “strong objectivity” as well as delve into what it means to
promote marginalized perspectives within inquiry.
SECTION 4: KNOWLEDGE INQUIRY THROUGH “STRONG
OBJECTIVITY” AND DIVERSITY AS A SOLUTION
So far, I have explored a traditional, western framework of the scientific
method as presented by Lastrucci. I then discussed a description of human
fertilization that is distorted due to gender stereotypes. We were left wondering
whether there is a flaw in the scientific method in general or if it was due to particular
errors in this investigation and/or theorizing. Feminist empiricists, such as Elizabeth
Anderson, advocate for applying the scientific method with more rigor, while
standpoint epistemologists, Sandra Harding, argues for a systematic shift in how we
understand the knower in relation to the object of knowledge. Anderson, and other
feminist empiricists, argue that we will be able to “solve for” social and cultural
biases within scientific inquiry over time while Harding argues that we need to make
more fundamental changes in order to avoid knowledge distortions in the first place.
In Section 3, I briefly presented Harding’s argument to maximize objectivity by
having the social and historical situatedness of the subject of knowledge widely
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accessible. Furthermore, I explored “strong objectivity” which requires that we apply
the same objectivity maximizing procedures to the subject as well as the object of
knowledge. In this section, I will explore what it means to engage in “strong
objectivity” and what it means, epistemically, to promote marginalized perspectives.
Recall, Harding’s “strong objectivity” focuses on examining the subject of
knowledge just as critically as the object of knowledge: “strong objectivity requires
that the subject of knowledge be placed on the same critical, causal plane as the
objects of knowledge” (458). Harding elaborates on what this critical plane may look
like in practice and why there is a need to engage with the subject of knowledge more
critically:
Strong objectivity requires what we can think of as ‘strong reflexivity’ ...
because culture-wide (or near culture wide) beliefs function as evidence at
every stage in scientific inquiry: in the selection of problems, the formation of
hypotheses, the design of research … the way results of research are reported,
etc. The subject of knowledge—the individual and the historically located
social community whose unexamined beliefs its members are likely to hold
‘unknowingly,’ so to speak —must be considered as part of knowledge from
the perspective of scientific method. (Harding 458)
The framework of standpoint epistemology explored in the previous section sheds
light on why Harding’s “strong reflectivity” demands that the subject of knowledge
be critically examined in relation to the object of knowledge. Here, Harding makes it
clear that we must critically examine the subject in relation to the object of
knowledge not only because the individual standpoint of the inquirer but also because
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of the collective beliefs the scientific community can ‘unknowingly’ hold. However,
it seems that the problem then lays in that the assumptions (and, thus, possible
problematic conceptions) are held unknowingly and are difficult to be critically
examined. Thus, we must incorporate “strong reflectivity” within the scientific
method such that we are able to better understand how the social and historical
situatedness effects the underlying beliefs that may contribute to distorted knowledge
inquiry.
In order to examine these cultural beliefs that go unexamined, we need to
engage with perspectives outside of the dominant narrative. Therefore, Harding
argues, we should promote perspectives of marginalized individuals and
communities. Harding states that:
…a maximally critical study of scientists and their communities can be done
only from the perspective of those whose lives have been marginalized by
such communities. Thus strong objectivity requires that scientists and their
communities be integrated into democracy advancing projects for scientific
and epistemological reasons as well as moral and political ones. (Harding 459)
Here, Harding argues that in order to critically assess the ways that subjects of
knowledge are inadvertently perpetuating problematic notions of gender, race, ability,
age, etc., and, consequently, distorting knowledge content, we must engage with
knowledge inquiry from the perspectives of marginalized people. This type of
analysis will allow for an understanding of the ways that the subject of knowledge
(scientist, inquirer, etc.) is involved in a cultural framework that perpetuates systems
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of inequality based, often, on false beliefs about certain communities which can, then,
produce knowledge that is distorted.
Using standpoint theory, Harding gives a few suggestions of how to engage in
inquiry from the perspective of marginalized people:
…learning to listen attentively to marginalized people; it requires educating
oneself about their histories, achievements, preferred social relations, hopes
for the future it requires putting one's body on the line for ‘their’ causes until
they feel like ‘our’ causes; it requires critical examination of the dominant
institutional beliefs and practices that systematically disadvantage them …
and more. (Harding 458)
Thus, Harding advocates for the active inclusion of marginalized perspectives within
formal scientific inquiry as a way to change our knowledge structures such that we
are able to examine the underlying assumptions/beliefs. “Strong objectivity”
therefore, involves considering the subject and its relationship to the object of
knowledge and, to do so, we must examine knowledge from the perspectives of
marginalized identities. Importantly, Harding does not require that people of
marginalized identities perform all inquiry, but rather that the entire knowledge
community promote the perspectives of marginalized identities as epistemically
advantageous because it allows us to understand where there are undelaying beliefs of
the dominant narrative that go unexamined.
Harding, in her essay “Whose Science, Whose Knowledge,” provides a more
comprehensive discussion of the importance of promoting inquiry from the
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perspectives of marginalized communities and how to go about pursuing inquiry in
this way:
Criticisms of the dominant thought of the West from both inside and outside
the West argue that its partiality and distortions are the consequence in large
part of starting that thought only from the lives of dominant groups … Less
partiality and less distortion result when thought starts from peasant life, not
just aristocratic life; from slaves’ lives, not just slaveowners’ lives; from the
lives of factory workers, not just of their bosses and managers … This
directive leaves open to be determined within each discipline or research area
what a researcher must do to start thought from women’s lives of the lives of
people in other marginalized groups, and it will be easier—though still
difficult—to provide reasonable responses to such a request in history or
sociology than in physics or chemistry. But the difficulty of providing an
analysis in physics or chemistry does not signify that the question is an absurd
one for knowledge-seeking in general, or that there are no reasonable answers
for those sciences, too. (Harding 161-62)
Here, Harding makes two main points. The first, is that taking knowledge claims from
the perspectives of marginalized people is epistemically advantageous and will
produce less distorted knowledge claims. The second, is that we must engage with
this premise in every aspect of knowledge inquiry, in any discipline. Therefore, it is
clear that engaging with inquiry from the perspectives of marginalized identities is a
crucial component to knowledge inquiry that is systematically equipped to prevent
knowledge distortions due to widespread, dominant cultural beliefs.
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In this section I examined Sandra Harding’s “strong objectivity” as a way to
reimagine objectivity such that we examine the subject and object of knowledge in
relation to one another. Harding uses a term she calls “strong reflexivity” as a
mechanism to reflect on the relationship between the subject and object of
knowledge. According to Harding, in order to engage with a subject’s social and
historical situatedness, in a way that we are able engage with unexamined, dominant
cultural beliefs, we must perform knowledge inquiry from the perspectives of
marginalized identities as it is epistemically advantageous. Therefore, by engaging in
epistemic inquiry from marginalized perspectives we can better understand how
widespread, problematic cultural biases and assumptions can affect the content of
knowledge.
So far, I have provided two main components of engaging in a new type of
inquiry that better assesses knowledge claims for distortions due to widespread,
problematic cultural biases. The first, is that we should engage in inquiry that allows
for the subject of knowledge to be critically assessed in relation to the object of
knowledge. The second, is that we must actively engage in inquiry from the
perspectives of marginalized communities. The last piece that is missing in this new
framework of knowledge inquiry that is paramount to undergoing inquiry that is less
distorted, is understanding how we can make active decisions, based on our value
system, to prevent knowledge systems from being distorted due to problematic,
cultural beliefs. values affect inquiry (even formal, scientific inquiry). In the
following section, I will take up this last point.
SECTION 5: VALUES WITHIN SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY
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In order to pursue the new framework of knowledge inquiry that I propose, we
must have a more robust understanding of the role values play within the landscape of
knowledge inquiry. Recall, so far I have established hat there are two main
components to engaging in knowledge inquiry that produce less distorted knowledge
inquiry, we must critically examine the knower in relation to what they know, 2)
make efforts to diversify inquirers within knowledge inquiry n this section I will
argue that because our values are embedded in the decisions that we make, we can
actively make decisions that promote values insofar as those values are explicitly
made clear as a part of inquiry. Specifically promoting feminist values will allow for
us to constantly engage with dominant narrative paradigms to dismantle systems of
oppression and establish undistorted knowledge inquiry.
In this section, I will first lay out Lastrucci’s argument for value-free science.
I will then object to his notion of value-free science, exploring Anderson’s,
Harding’s, Douglas’, and Longino’s arguments on the role values play in science.
Each of these feminist epistemologist’ builds on the previous arguments and aids in
our understanding of why we can make active decisions based on our values.
Anderson asserts that values cannot and should not be separated from science.
Harding claims, focusing on the external components of inquiry such as hypothesis
formation, that we must accept that values are a part of inquiry. Douglas’ builds on
Harding’s argument, emphasizing the role values play in internal components of
formal scientific inquiry, such as data collection and deductive reasoning. Heather
Longino goes one step further and argues that if we acknowledge that both internal
and external components of science are value-laden, then we can make active
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decisions about which values to promote within our own inquiry. I will argue that one
of the major components of knowledge inquiry free from distortions due to
widespread, cultural assumptions, is to acknowledge that the role values play within
inquiry and make active decisions to promote feminist values.
First off, I will examine Lastrucci’s take on values within inquiry, as an
exemplary case of western, traditional frameworks of knowledge inquiry. In
Lastrucci’s discussion on the scientific method, he considers the role values play
within research and how values can, inadvertently, influence the outcomes of
research. Lastrucci says that a scientist can be “influenced by cultural values … in his
choice of problems’ for research, and of course in the impetus which led him to
become a seeker of knowledge in the first place” (Lastrucci 7). Lastrucci states, that
in this “sense of the term ‘value,’ it is undoubtedly true that every person, including
the scientist, is a product of his time and culture, and therefore cannot escape the
influences of its value system” (9). Lastrucci is confident, however, that scientists are
trained to assess their data “with as little bias as possible” and the scientific
community, a a whole, constantly strives to maximize objectivity (Lastrucci 7). Here,
Lastrucci is arguing that although cultural values may influence scientists’ decisionmaking processes, there are objectivity-maximizing tools in place (i.e. the scientific
method and experts trained to eliminate bias). Thus, according to views like
Lastrucci’s, it is clear that we should strive to engage with knowledge inquiry that is
as value-free as possible.
In direct response to positions such as Lastrucci’s that claim value-free
science, feminist epistemologists assert that we need to engage with the question of
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values as part of scientific inquiry, as they are integral to the research process. As I
have mentioned, I will specifically explore Elizabeth Anderson’s, Sandra Harding’s,
Heather Douglas’s, and Helen Longino’s arguments.
Anderson brings to light how acknowledging embedded values within
scientific inquiry is important because it can bring out inconsistent assumptions that
may be distorting knowledge claims. Anderson cites Longino, who argues that, “the
logical gap between theory and observation ensures that one cannot in principle rule
out the possibility that value judgments are implicit in the background assumptions
used to argue that a given observation constitutes evidence for a given hypothesis
(Longino 199)” (Anderson 78). Here, it is clear, to that Anderson values to influence
background assumptions within inquiry. Anderson makes it clear that we must
acknowledge that these values play a role within inquiry such that our background
assumptions can be made more apparent. Therefore, Anderson’s argument for
applying the scientific method more rigorously to correct for biases also asks that we
acknowledge the role cultural values and beliefs play in knowledge inquiry such that
we can check for inconsistencies of assumptions. For instance, in the fertilization
example, in the hypothesis formation of the egg as passive, the background
assumptions about a passive female could be made apparent such that it is clear it is
influencing knowledge inquiry. Therefore, because we value accurate knowledge
inquiry and inquiry free of the influence of problematic cultural beliefs, we would
need to correct the hypothesis and reexamine the data.
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Harding goes on step further than Anderson, arguing that not only can we
acknowledge the role values play within inquiry, we can also allow that there are
certain values that create for less distorted knowledge claims. Harding writes,
…objectivists [like Lastrucci] claim that objectivity requires the elimination
of all social values and interests from the research process and the results of
research. It is clear, however, that not all social values and interests have the
same bad effects upon the results of research. Democracy advancing values
have systematically generated less partial and distorted beliefs than others.
(Harding 460)
To Harding, those who adhere to a definition of science like Lastrucci’s, which
supports value-free science, fail to understand that values can be beneficial within
inquiry and allow for less distorted knowledge claims. Thus, in order to understand
how knowledge claims can be influenced by our values (whether positively or
negatively), we must engage in Harding’s “strong objectivity” and perform a critical
examination of how the subject of knowledge is historically and socially situated in
relation to the object of knowledge. Furthermore, according to Harding, in order to
perform knowledge inquiry that isn’t distorted by dominant, cultural beliefs, we can
promote values such as democracy-advancing ones that will systematically produce
less-distorted knowledge. It seems that feminist values may be considered one of
these values as well.
Heather Douglas in “Rejecting the Ideal of Value-Free Science,” builds on
Harding’s argument and adds another important step to recognizing the role that
values play in inquiry. Douglas argues that we must acknowledge the role of values in
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every component of knowledge inquiry, including internal components. Douglas
asserts that:
…it has been widely acknowledged that science requires the use of
nonepistemic values in the “external” parts of science, that is, the choice of
projects, limitations of methodology (particularly with respect to the use of
human subjects), and the application of science-related technologies. So the
term value-free science really refers to the norm of epistemic values only in
the internal stages of science… the belief persists that if we accept the
presence of values (particularly nonepistemic values) in the inner working of
science, we will destroy science and set ourselves adrift on the restless seas of
relativism. (Douglas 121)
Douglas’ argument here is important to situate in relation to Anderson and Hardin’s
argument. It is clear that all three of them acknowledge, although in different ways,
the reliance on non-epistemic values for external aspects of inquiry. Douglas,
however, posits that it is important to acknowledge that values are also present within
internal components of science, reasoning and observation. Douglas states that
“rejecting the value-free ideal [of internal components of science] would be good for
science by allowing for more open discussion of the factors that enter into scientific
judgments and the experimental process” (Douglas 121). Here, Douglas argues that in
order to engage in the ways that knowledge inquiry has been influenced and possibly
distorted by cultural values, we must examine the role values play in every aspect of
inquiry. Interestingly, this pushes arguments from Anderson and Harding, one step
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further demanding that we acknowledge that values are embedded in every aspect of
inquiry.
Helen Longino, in “Can There be a Feminist Science?” takes the
acknowledgement of values playing a role in every aspect of scientific inquiry,
including internal components, another step further. Longino begins by
acknowledging, like Douglas, that internal components such as observation and
reasoning are heavily influenced by cultural values (Longino 54). Longino explains
that traditional frameworks of scientific inquiry claim that “good science” is protected
from values by the scientific methodology whereas “bad science” allows for the
influence of values (Longino 53). Responding directly to those who argue, that valueladen science is considered ‘bad science,’ Longino posits that “If … there is no a
priori way to eliminate [value-laden] assumptions from evidential reasoning
generally, and, hence, no way to rule out value-laden assumptions, then there there is
no formal basis for arguing that an inference mediated by contextual [cultural] values
is thereby bad science” (Longino 55). In other words, there is no way to eliminate
value-laden assumptions from internal components of inquiry and allow for value
assumptions to be a part of external components of inquiry.
Longino further explains that, within inquiry, scientists are making active
choices about what to study, how to collect their data, the hypothesis they form, etc.
(Longino 53). Longino argues that scientists (or the subject of knowledge within
inquiry), must be attentive to how they acknowledge values within inquiry. Longino
argues that statements like “it was observed” obscure the role of the scientist from
any participation or influence. However, if we reject the view of value-free science
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then we must also reject our role as a passive onlooker (56). Longino concludes that if
we recognize that science is not value-free and that our feminist, political interests
can promote science free of gender biases; then, instead of waiting to let the data
show the scientist what to do (which may promote androcentric and sexist
knowledge), scientists should acknowledge their ability to affect inquiry and make
decisions that are consistent with the values and commitments of feminism. Scientists
can choose to whom, socially and politically, they are accountable to (61).
Longino’s argument not only allows for feminist scientists to push for
political equality and promote less biases knowledge production, but that they should.
These scientists make decisions on what they research, their hypothesis, populations
studied, etc. and by recognizing that each decision has value imbedded in it, allows
for feminist scientists to make choices informed by values they find important. It is
clear, therefore, that Longino takes the acknowledgement of values in all components
of knowledge inquiry one step further, arguing that because we are able to understand
how our decisions are influenced by values we can make an active decision to choose
what these values are.
I engaged with Anderson, Harding, Douglas, and Longino to effectively
explore the ways that acknowledging that values are present in inquiry, both in
internal and external components of inquiry. This leads to a conclusion that we are
able to make active decisions based on our values. It is not only important but also
requires us, as inquirers, to make decisions based on our value systems. Anderson
argues that we always incorporate values as we make decisions, specifically in how
we understand theory in relation to observation. Harding builds on this arguing that
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eliminating all values from inquiry is not feasible as there are values embedded in
inquiry that promote less distorted knowledge claims. Douglas takes Harding and
Anderson’s assertions about values within inquiry and makes it clear that we must
understand that every aspect of scientific inquiry is value-laden, including the internal
components of science. Helen Longino builds on Douglas’ argument and posits that if
we take internal and external components of inquiry as value-laden, then we should
be able to choose the values that we want to promote within inquiry and who we
choose to hold ourselves accountable to. Therefore, Longino argues that we can, and
should, make decisions based in feminist values.
For the purpose of creating knowledge inquiry free from distortions, it is
important to engage in inquiry to promote feminist values. Feminist values will
promote dismantling systems of oppression and marginalized perspectives such that
we are able to systematically identify the underlying dominant assumptions.
So far, I have explored a traditional western framework of scientific inquiry as
presented by Lastrucci and engaged with what happens to that framework after we
understand that knowledge can be distorted by problematic cultural assumptions
about gender. In order to engage with scientific inquiry in a more holistic capacity
that strives to correct for these distortions I have posited three main strategies 1)
engage in critical examination and objectivity-maximizing tests of subject of
knowledge in relation to the object of knowledge 2) diversify the inquirers involved
and perform knowledge inquiry from marginalized perspectives and 3) acknowledge
the role that values play in knowledge production, critically examine the different
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values at play and allow that these can be active decisions made based on values,
specifically promoting feminist values.
SECTION 6: HAACK’S OBJECTION
In this section I will explore an objection to the scientific knowledge inquiry
that that I have advocated for which 1) examines the subject in relation to the object
of knowledge, 2) performs inquiry from marginalized perspectives and 3)
acknowledges and critically engages with the presence of values in science,
promoting feminist values. Susan Haack’s objection presents an argument that has
been reiterated across time, arguing that my account, and others like it that call for a
shift in what we take the main tenants of scientific inquiry, only create further issues
issues within inquiry.
Haack, in “Epistemological Reflections of an Old Feminist,” posits that
feminist epistemologists have taken their arguments too far when they claim that we
need to shift fundamental components of scientific inquiry. Haack establishes that
there are only two routes by which feminism and epistemology could be connected.
The two routes correspond to two interpretations of the phrase “the woman's point of
view”: as “the way women see things,” or as “serving the interests of women””
(Haack 32).
Haack does not take a women’s perspective, or the perspective of any
marginalized identity, to be epistemically different. Haack explores what it would
mean to interpret feminist epistemology as exploring a particular way for “women to
see things” assessing this as women having a particular “way of knowing” (Haack
32). Haack dismisses the possibility that women have a particular method of knowing
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because each individual has differences “in cognitive style, like differences in
handwriting, [which] seem more individual than gender-determined” (Haack 33).
Furthermore, Haack objects to the claim that “oppressed, disadvantaged, and
marginalized people are epistemically privileged in virtue of their oppression and
disadvantage” (33). Haack argues that if this were true then “it would suggest that the
most epistemically privileged are not the affluent, well-educated, white, Western
women … but [rather] the most oppressed, the most disadvantaged--some of whom
are men” (Haack 33). Here, it is clear that Haack fails to understand that knowledge
inquiry which I have proposed does not refer to a feminism that centers women but
rather to movement committed to ending all systems of oppression.
Haack continues her discussion by questioning what whether there is an
epistemic advantage to being at the margins of inquiry. Haack states that “Thomas
Kuhn observed that revolutionary scientific innovations are often made by persons
who are at the margin of a discipline; but women, as a class, are not "marginal" in this
sense” (Haack 33). According to Haack, although there may be particular moments
where important insights come from the margins of a discipline, it does not follow
that women are at the margin of a discipline in the same way. However, it seems that
Haack is, again, missing the point. Although women may not be at the margins of a
discipline in the same way that Thomas Kuhn’s account of scientists during the
scientific revolution, women have been historically pushed out of knowledge inquiry.
Karen Messing, in “Women’s Occupational Health and Androcentric Science,”
provides us with an example of what it means to ignore women within inquiry. In her
article, Messing discusses compensated occupational illness in Québec (Messing 11).
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Messing found that women had been historically and systematically excluded from
research on occupational health for a number of unfounded reasons. Messing asserts
that “the elimination of women from studies of occupational cancer reinforces the
notion that women’s jobs are safe and that women’s concerns are unfounded”
(Messing 11). Contrary to Haack’s assertion, including women in scientific inquiry
both as scientists and subjects can have a major effect on how knowledge inquiry is
conducted and, consequently, what is the knowledge content produced. As
exemplified through Messing’s case study, the margins offer an epistemically
advantageous outlook to establish where knowledge claims can be unfounded or
distorted as well as offer new perspectives because there is less pressure to conform
or fit the dominant paradigms.
Haack argues that “one of the ways in which oppressed people are oppressed
is, surely, that their oppressors control the information that reaches them. This argues,
if anything, an epistemic disadvantage for ‘oppressed, disadvantaged, marginalized’
people” (33). Here, Haack claims that because people in positions of power are able
to withhold information from individuals and communities at the margins of society,
it is clear that those who exist at the margins are at an epistemic disadvantage. Haack
fails to understand that the questions/content of knowledge is shaped by the social
position of the individual (as it has been explored). In other words, its not the actual
information that they have accessible to them but rather the ways that they go about
engaging in inquiry in the first place. For instance, in the example provided by
Messing, the knowledge content remains incorrect so long as we continue to ignore
and exclude women from the research. Furthermore, Haack fails to understand the
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ways in which the inquiry framework I have proposed does not require that
marginalized people perform inquiry but rather promotes inquiry from marginalized
perspectives. The reason that these perspectives should be centered in our knowledge
inquiry is due to that particular social position, there is an opportunity to understand
how knowledge systematically fails to include or represent issues, thoughts,
questions, etc. as the privileged positions in society is the standard narrative. It is not
the marginalized individual that is responsible for working towards a more
comprehensive knowledge inquiry, but rather that a shift to beginning all knowledge
inquiry from the perspectives of marginalized identities. Therefore, Haack fails to
engage with the possibility that the social positionality of an individual can inform
their knowledge. Moreover, Haack fails to realize that the perspective of marginalized
identities provides an epistemic advantage as it lays outside the dominant paradigm.
Recall, to Haack, the second interpretation of “the woman’s point of view” is
“serving the interests of women.” The exclusion of the interests of women suggests
that sexism in scientific theorizing is the result of the exclusion of female “ways of
knowing’” within knowledge inquiry (33). Haack grants that women are a bit more
likely to notice sexism than men and that some theories in social sciences and biology
may have been accepted as scientists involved could have taken stereotypical ideas of
gender norms as fact (Haack 34). Haack argues that realizing that specific theories
can be influenced by gender stereotypes should not lead us to include political
motivations within inquiry and reasoning. Therefore, if we grant that the example of
fertilization is distorted due to social conceptions of gender, we would not then be
warranted to agree with my proposed framework that we can actively make decisions
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about the values that we wish to promote. Rather, Haack argues, we must critically
examine those specific theories and apply our standards of evidence more strictly.
Haack posits that there is currently a tendency to see these instances of gender bias in
knowledge and make radical changes to how we preform knowledge inquiry - these
theorists, Haack argues, are “new cynics.” Haack states that the shift to this cynicism
of science “sees science as a value-permeated social institution, stresses the
importance of politics, prejudice and propaganda rather than the weight of the
evidence” (Haack 34). It is clear, here, that Haack fails to understand systematic issue
of distorted knowledge claims due to widespread cultural beliefs. Recall, from
Section 2 the example of the distorted knowledge claim of human fertilization due to
socially constructed conceptions about gender. As I have demonstrated, the
widespread influence of cultural beliefs on knowledge claims calls for a systematic
shift in the way we understand objectivity, from which perspectives we engage in
inquiry and the role values play in our decision-making.
Haack objects specifically to two important lines of argument used by
feminist epistemologists – underdetermination and value-ladenness. I will focus on
Haack’s objection to value-ladennes as it directly responds to the last point in my
proposed framework for knowledge inquiry about actively making decisions based on
the feminist values we wish to promote. Haack summarizes feminist epistemologists’
argument about the presence of values within science, stating that feminist
epistemologists claim that “it is impossible entirely to exclude "contextual" (i.e.,
external, social, and political) values from science” (Haack 35). According to Haack,
this argument is a non sequitur. Haack claims that even if it is true “that scientists are
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never entirely without prejudice” and “it is impossible that they should entirely put
their prejudices out of sight when judging the evidence for a theory; it doesn't follow
that it is proper to allow prejudice to determine theory choice” (Haack 36). Here,
Haack establishes that we shouldn’t change how we engage with knowledge inquiry
after we recognize the potential for its distortions due to social and cultural
influences. Instead, Haack concludes that “even if it is not possible to make science
perfect, it doesn't follow that we shouldn't try to make it better” (Haack 36). It is clear
that Haack understands the argument for value-laden science on the surface; however,
she, again, fails to recognize the systematic nature of the role values play within
inquiry. Values are embedded in every component of inquiry. Thus, it is not clear that
inquiry should make any attempt to distance itself from values if such an endeavor is
not possible. Therefore, although Haack presents an interesting nuance to the
argument, her objection fails to hold much ground.
Haack grants that there are aspects of feminist epistemologists’ critiques of
scientific inquiry that are important to take into consideration. For instance, it is true
that sometimes evidence is only considered relevant when there are persuasive factors
such as the possibility of success or compensation. However, Haack argues that
acknowledging that evidence-based inquiry can have distortions does not lead to the
radical conclusions such as the ones that I have proposed. Haack concludes that “the
epistemological significance of feminist criticisms of sexism in scientific theorizing,
though real enough, is undramatic and by no means revolutionary” (Haack 37).
Haack’s objection to my proposed framework of knowledge inquiry severely
misunderstands the systematic implications of gender bias distortions of knowledge.
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Furthermore, Haack misunderstands the premise of mine, and other feminist
epistemologists’ argument. By beginning her argument against feminist
epistemologists with an understanding of feminism as “from a woman’s point of
view,” Haack narrows the argument to a particular rhetoric that can only have two
interpretations. Importantly, feminist epistemologists do not advocate solely for the
inclusion of women but rather engage with the historical marginalization of women as
a systematic issue that should be addressed systematically and all developed solution
should strive to end all oppression, not just sexism. Thus, Haack claims that feminist
epistemologists do not make any revolutionary arguments her holds little ground
because she does not take into consideration the larger, systematic concerns about
knowledge distortions due to socially constructed conceptions of gender.
In this section, I explored Haack’s objection to knowledge inquiry I have
proposes which strategies 1) engages in critical examination and objectivitymaximizing tests of subject of knowledge in relation to the object of knowledge 2)
promotes the diversity of inquirers involved and perform knowledge inquiry from
marginalized perspectives and 3) acknowledges the role that values play in
knowledge production, specifically advocating for promoting feminist values. Haack
argues that women do not have a particular way of knowing since understanding and
acquiring knowledge cannot be correlated with gender. Furthermore, Haack argues
that acknowledging that there are values present within scientific inquiry does not
mean that we shouldn’t try to pursue value-free science. Haack’s argument that
knowledge is not inherently connected to gender is reasonable. However, Haack fails
to consider the ways in which understanding perspectives of women who have been
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systematically marginalized in inquiry can point towards places where knowledge
inquiry is failing and knowledge is distorted due to problematic biases. Haack’s
argument for value-free science fails to holistically take on the role values play within
inquiry, internally and externally. Haack asserts that we must apply the scientific
method with more rigor and stop being so cynical about scientific inquiry. However,
it is clear that fails to fully engage with the systematic implications of distortions of
knowledge claims due to socially constructed conceptions about gender.
Haack’s objection, therefore, holds little ground against the new framework
that I have developed. The one change that Haack’s objection demands is an explicit
consideration of how the components are systematic concerns. Therefore, I am left
with the following components that are necessary for inquiry that is less distorted due
to problematic cultural assumptions about gender: 1) we must critically and
systematically examine the subject of knowledge in relation to the object of
knowledge, 2) make efforts to diversify inquirers as the perspectives of marginalized
identities are important to informing where dominant narratives are failing to be
objective and 3) actively acknowledge the role that values play in inquiry and
promote feminist values.
SECTION 7: CONCLUSION
I began by examining a definition of traditional, western scientific inquiry as
presented by Lastrucci such that science is to be objective, logical, and systematic. I
then presented the example of human fertilization, discussed by Spanier, as a
knowledge claim that had been distorted by problematic cultural beliefs and
assumptions about gender. An in-depth analysis of Spanier’s discussion, provides us
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with an understanding of the way that problematic gender roles influence how we
understand, teach and, consequently, know the process of human fertilization. We
were then left wondering if the example of human fertilization should be considered
an error in this particular example or if it indicates that we should make a changes to
the systematic approach to scientific inquiry. In order to engage this question, I turned
to feminist epistemologists Elizabeth Anderson, Sandra Harding, and others. It
became clear that feminist empiricists ask evidence-based questions about the
particular circumstances of knowledge inquiry in the fertilization example and
propose that the scientists adhere more rigorously to the scientific method. Standpoint
epistemology advocates for maximizing objectivity by making information about the
relationship between the subject and object of knowledge widely accessible. Sandra
Harding’s framework, based in standpoint epistemology, established that we must
engage with a new type of objectivity, “strong objectivity,” such that we can reflect
on the influence the social position of the subject (the knower) could have on the the
object (the content) of knowledge. In order to systematically engage with how
dominant narratives, fail to maximize objectivity, we must perform inquiry from
marginalized perspectives. Importantly, the argument does not require that
marginalized individuals conduct knowledge inquiry but rather that there is a
continuous effort made to engage in knowledge inquiry from those perspectives.
Furthermore, through an exploration of Anderson, Harding, Douglas and Longino, it
is clear that we must acknowledge and critically examine the role values play in
knowledge inquiry. Values are deeply embedded in both internal and external
components of inquiry. If we acknowledge the role that values play within scientific

Bucciarelli 54
inquiry, then we should, and can, make decisions to promote values endorse –
namely, feminist values. Thus, I propose three main components to knowledge
inquiry that minimizes distortions due to problematic cultural beliefs about gender: 1)
critically and systematically examine the subject of knowledge in relation to the
object of knowledge, 2) make efforts to diversify inquirers as the perspectives of
marginalized identities are important to informing where dominant narratives are
failing to be objective and 3) actively acknowledge the role that values play in inquiry
and promote feminist values. When exploring an objection presented by Haack to this
proposed inquiry, it became clear the the emphasis needs to be on the systematic
implications of distorted knowledge inquiry and consequent solutions.
Importantly, although this discussion began with an exploration of scientific
inquiry it does not end there. I first sought to engage with scientific inquiry because it
claims to be the “most objective” type of knowledge inquiry and so, should be best
equipped to eliminate distortions caused by gender (and other) biases. However,
through my exploration, it is clear that the scientific method, as it stands, is far from
being free of knowledge distortions. Therefore, the three mechanisms that I have laid
out are helpful such that we can apply them to individual interactions we have with
knowers, everyday. I have shown that it is possible and, in fact, likely, that your
beliefs are distorted by problematic biases that you may hold. Therefore, in order to
have more accurate beliefs, we should be actively engaging each of the mechanisms
(always look at the object of knowledge in relation the subject, advocating to engage
in inquiry from marginalized perspectives and acknowledge the values we hold, such
that you can make decisions based on the values you hold). Whether that be in an
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interaction with a classmate, a friend, in your own reflexive practices, or in any
epistemic interaction, taking the time to consider the way in which your knowledge
inquiry is can be distorted due to widespread, cultural beliefs is paramount. Engaging
in the three component of inquiry that I have proposed, will allow for your epistemic
interactions to critically examine how your knowledge may be shaped by problematic
cultural beliefs that you may not even know that you hold.
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Notes
i

Emily Martin discusses it in her book The Woman in the Body (Martin,

Emily. The Woman in the Body: A Cultural Analysis of Reproduction. 2001 ed.,
Beacon Press, 2001) and and feminist philosophy of science writes directly to
scientists on ways to engage with gender in science (Richardson, Sarah S. “Feminist
Philosophy of Science: History, Contributions, and Challenges.” Synthese, vol. 177,
no. 3, 2010, pp. 337–362. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40985708).
ii

To Harding, there is a difference between “the original "spontaneous"

feminist empiricism and a recent philosophical version.” Harding explains that
“originally, feminist empiricism arose as the "spontaneous consciousness" of feminist
researchers in biology and the social sciences who were trying to explain what was
and what wasn't different about their research process in comparison with the
standard procedures in their field” (Harding 440). Spontaneous feminist empiricists
point to these specific moments where knowledge inquiry may fail to correct for
gender bias, considering them particulars instead of systematic issues.

